\u3cem\u3eThe Modern Corporation\u3c/em\u3e as Social Construction by Mizruchi, Mark S. & Hirschman, Daniel
 
 1065
The Modern Corporation as Social Construction 
Mark S. Mizruchi, Ph.D.† 
Daniel Hirschman†† 
INTRODUCTION 
Classic works, Mark Mizruchi and Lisa Fein argued, share a 
particular fate.1  Authors often cite classic works without reading them—
or without reading them carefully.  When the classics are read, they are 
subjected to selective interpretation as readers emphasize the parts that fit 
their preconceived notions of the world, while tending to minimize or 
ignore those that do not.  As these selective interpretations are 
disseminated into an academic discipline, members of the field derive 
their views not from the work itself, but from interpretations of the work 
rendered by others.  These interpretations then come to be accepted as 
the “correct” readings.  The classic work thus develops a socially 
constructed character, in which certain components of the original—
those that fit with collectively accepted views—become the prevailing 
interpretation of the work itself.  This social construction is one reason, 
Mizruchi and Fein suggested, that readers often experience such surprise 
when they actually read (or return to) the original classic. 
There are many works that exhibit this phenomenon.  Mizruchi and 
Fein used as their example Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell’s essay on 
the tendency for organizations to come to resemble one another over 
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time.2  Another work in the sociology of organizations, Arthur 
Stinchcombe’s classic article on social structure and organizations,3 has 
also been selectively interpreted, as has Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald 
Salancik’s study of the external control of organizations.4  Yet perhaps 
no single work fits the above description better than one of the most 
important books on the large corporation ever published: Adolf Berle and 
Gardiner Means’s The Modern Corporation and Private Property.5  One 
can speculate that few works in the social sciences have been as often 
cited and as little read.  As a consequence, we would expect The Modern 
Corporation to be a good candidate for either selective interpretation or 
outright misinterpretation.  And as we shall demonstrate, the book did 
indeed receive such treatment. 
Although Berle and Means were concerned with the concentration 
of economic power and saw the separation of ownership from control as 
contributing to this trend, subsequent authors who relied on Berle and 
Means’s findings used them to reach very different conclusions.  In 
particular, The Modern Corporation became an important touchstone for 
a group of prominent mid-twentieth-century scholars, including Daniel 
Bell, Ralf Dahrendorf, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Talcott Parsons.6  
Drawing on Berle and Means, these authors presented a view of the large 
American corporation that was considerably more benign than that 
advanced in The Modern Corporation.  In this paper, we will show that 
the findings of The Modern Corporation were used to argue that the 
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concentration of power in American society had declined, a view exactly 
the opposite of what Berle and Means suggested.  These more 
celebratory readings of Berle and Means subsequently became the 
objects of criticism in their own right, however.7  Still, these works 
contained highly textured and nuanced understandings of the post-World 
War II United States.  The analyses they presented, we argue, 
represented significant contributions, despite their questionable 
interpretation of The Modern Corporation. 
We argue that in the post-World War II period, a leading segment 
of the American corporate elite adopted a moderate, pragmatic approach 
that included an accommodation to government intervention in the 
economy and an acceptance of the rights of organized labor.  We argue 
that the managerial autonomy spawned by the separation of ownership 
and control provided the conditions within which American corporate 
executives could engage in these policies.  This system, however, began 
to break down in the 1970s, and a major acquisition wave in the 1980s 
brought stockholders back to prominence.  Faced with pressures not seen 
since the early 1900s, corporate managers became increasingly short-
sighted, and the corporate elite became increasingly fragmented.  The 
result has been a business community unable to organize to address the 
problems of the twenty-first century in a way that its predecessors did in 
earlier decades.  We conclude by discussing the implications of this 
argument for the thesis of The Modern Corporation. 
Our goals in this paper are fourfold.  First, we present what we see 
as Berle and Means’s primary contributions in The Modern Corporation.  
Second, we describe various interpretations of this classic and situate 
these interpretations in their historical contexts.  Third, we discuss the 
extent to which these interpretations provided an accurate account of the 
state of the American corporation and American business in the post-
World War II period.  We argue that these interpretations can be 
reconciled when we take into account the countervailing forces of the 
state, labor, and the financial community that created the conditions for a 
moderate, pragmatic approach to corporate governance.  Finally, we 
discuss the changes that have occurred since the postwar period, from the 
1970s on, and assess the fate of The Modern Corporation in light of 
those changes. 
                                                 
 7. See, e.g., Maurice Zeitlin, Corporate Ownership and Control: The Large Corporation and 
the Capitalist Class, 79 AM. J. OF SOC. 1073 (1974); see also Mark S. Mizruchi, Who Controls 
Whom?  An Examination of the Relation between Management and Boards of Directors in Large 
American Corporations, 8 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 426 (1983) [hereinafter Who Controls Whom?]. 
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I.  THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE MODERN CORPORATION 
In The Modern Corporation,8 Berle and Means began their 
argument by emphasizing that the rise of the large corporation in the 
United States left an enormous concentration of economic power in a 
relatively small number of organizations.  They noted that virtually all 
Americans, in the course of their daily lives, are touched in one way or 
another by large corporations.9  They showed that during the 1920s, the 
200 largest American nonfinancial corporations experienced a growth 
rate of between two and three times that of smaller nonfinancial firms.10  
In addition, they raised an issue that constitutes a major theme of the 
book: American society is being transformed from one ruled primarily by 
market forces toward one in which a relatively small number of 
individuals control the bulk of the productive capacity.11  They 
continued: 
The economic power in the hands of the few persons who control a 
giant corporation is a tremendous force [that] can harm or benefit a 
multitude of individuals, affect whole districts, shift the currents of 
trade, bring ruin to one community and prosperity to another.  The 
organizations which they control have passed far beyond the realm 
of private enterprise—they have become more nearly social 
institutions.12 
Berle and Means argued that as both a cause and a consequence of 
the enormous size of corporations, stock ownership had become 
increasingly dispersed.  This is the component of the book that received 
the most attention, especially in the post-World War II era.  In giant 
corporations such as the Pennsylvania Railroad and United States Steel, 
the largest stockholders owned less than 1% of the stock.13  This stock 
dispersal had increased rapidly since the early 1900s: American 
Telephone and Telegraph, for example, went from 10,000 stockholders 
in 1901 to more than 642,000 by 1931, and U.S. Steel’s number of 
owners increased more than tenfold during the same period.14  Moreover, 
in the five-year period between 1916 and 1921, the distribution of 
                                                 
 8. In the following paragraphs, we will describe what we see as the primary argument of the 
book.  Because The Modern Corporation is a broad, deep, and richly textured work, no brief 
summary can do it justice.  It is thus unavoidable that there are some aspects of the book that we will 
emphasize more than others.  We encourage readers to return to the original work, which addresses a 
considerably broader range of issues. 
 9. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 5, at 19–28. 
 10. Id. at 33–41. 
 11. Id. at 46. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 47. 
 14. Id. at 52. 
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ownership became increasingly dispersed across a broad range of income 
groups—a change of “almost revolutionary proportions,” according to 
Berle and Means.15  The most important outcome of this process for the 
authors, however, was that with the dispersal of stock, the owners of 
large corporations had become increasingly passive with regard to 
control of the firm: 
In place of actual physical properties over which the owner could 
exercise direction and for which he was responsible, the owner now 
holds a piece of paper representing a set of rights and expectations 
with respect to an enterprise.  But over the enterprise and over the 
physical property—the instruments of production—in which he has 
an interest, the owner has little control.16 
With stockholders increasingly dispersed and passive with respect 
to a firm’s administration, who then assumed control?  According to 
Berle and Means, direction of a firm’s activities is exercised through the 
board of directors.  Control thus lies with those who have the power to 
select the directors.17  The authors distinguished five types of control: 
control through almost complete ownership, control through majority 
ownership, control through a legal device, control through minority 
ownership, and management control.  The first two forms of control each 
involve some aspect of majority ownership, in which the majority owner 
has the ability to overrule any opposition, while the third, control through 
a legal device, involves several forms, one of which (pyramiding) 
includes effective majority ownership.  Most interesting for our purposes 
are the last two types, minority control and management control.  
Owners can control a firm with fewer than 50% of the shares, Berle and 
Means argued, but such control is not guaranteed.  In the famous 
Standard Oil of Indiana proxy fight, in which John D. Rockefeller, Jr. 
was barely able to oust the firm’s management, Rockefeller was the 
holder of 14.9% of the company’s stock.18  To Berle and Means, this 
percentage represented the likely lowest point at which control via stock 
ownership could be maintained.  They ultimately settled on an 
admittedly arbitrary figure of 20% as the minimum level of ownership 
necessary for minority control.19  In cases in which no single owner was 
                                                 
 15. Id. at 60. 
 16. Id. at 64. 
 17. Id. at 66–67.  Berle and Means defined management as the “board of directors and the 
senior officers of the corporation.”  Id. at 196.  Most subsequent authors defined management as the 
senior officers only.  Mizruchi, Who Controls Whom?, supra note 7, at 427.  We will use Berle and 
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 18. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 5, at 76. 
 19. Id. at 108. 
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above this threshold, control of the firm was said to be effectively in the 
hands of management, those who ran the day-to-day operations of the 
firm.  In a detailed analysis of the 200 largest American nonfinancial 
corporations in 1929, the authors found that 44% of the firms could be 
classified as management controlled.20  Given the historical proliferation 
of stockholders that Berle and Means had identified, it stood to reason 
that the American corporation was becoming increasingly characterized 
by management control.  Although not without controversy, a study by 
Robert Larner confirmed this trend decades later.  Relying on data from 
1964, Larner pronounced the managerial revolution “close to 
complete.”21 
Berle and Means argued that the separation of ownership from 
control had several important consequences.  Initially, as stockholders 
became increasingly dispersed and increasingly passive, they lost both 
their ability and their interest in offering input into the firm’s policies.  
Instead, stockholders increasingly viewed their stocks as investments, 
limiting their concerns to dividend payouts and the value of their 
equities.  This meant that the firm’s managers became increasingly 
insulated from the influence of stockholders.  Meanwhile, because of the 
growing concentration of industry and managers’ increasing 
independence from owners, managers gained control over the 
distribution of revenue, allowing them to reduce dividends and increase 
retained earnings.22 
In light of the separation of ownership from control, Berle and 
Means advanced an alternative to the traditional justifications for the 
distribution of corporate profits.  Economic logic—the “logic of 
profits”—suggested that those doing the work should be incentivized to 
work harder, and thus, the firm’s profits should go to the managers.23  
Legal logic—the “logic of property”—suggested that stockholders 
should receive the firm’s profits because they are the rightful owners.24  
Berle and Means argued that neither of these arguments is valid because 
they both fail to recognize that property and wealth no longer mean the 
same things that they did in the time of Adam Smith.  For Smith, there 
was no distinction between ownership and control and no difference 
between passive property—shares of stocks or bonds—and active 
property—the relationship of control that managers have to the 
                                                 
 20. Id. at 86–107. 
 21. ROBERT J. LARNER, MANAGEMENT CONTROL AND THE LARGE CORPORATION (Dunellen 
1970). 
 22. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 5, at 112–16. 
 23. Id. at 299–302. 
 24. Id. at 293–98. 
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corporation.25  Because private property split into these two new forms, 
the traditional logic of property no longer applies. 
Similarly, Berle and Means argued that the profit motive itself has 
changed in form.26  Given the immense magnitude of profits available to 
large firms to distribute as incentives, as well as the diminishing returns 
associated with additional amounts of income, there is no reason to 
believe that managers would work twice as hard to make twice as much 
money.  Instead, Berle and Means suggested “that more could be learned 
regarding [the motives of managers] by studying the motives of an 
Alexander the Great, seeking new worlds to conquer, than by considering 
the motives of a petty tradesman of the days of Adam Smith.”27  Since it 
is not obvious that either managers or owners should be entitled to the 
profits of modern corporations, Berle and Means suggested a third 
option, one that recognized that corporations have become political units 
as much as economic enterprises. 
Importantly, Berle and Means described the separation of 
ownership and control with some degree of consternation.  The 
increasing autonomy of management led to a growing concentration of 
power in a relatively small group of individuals who were potentially 
unaccountable to any external forces.  In Berle and Means’s view, this 
lack of accountability raised potential concerns for the future of 
American democracy.  Given corporations’ prominent positions in 
society and the enormous consequences of their actions, the nation faced 
a difficult set of decisions about their proper role. 
In the latter part of the book, the authors returned to their earlier 
concern, noted above, about the role of the corporation as a social 
institution.  Given its prominence and power, the corporation may have 
an obligation to serve those beyond its stockholders.  As we have seen, 
for Berle and Means, neither managers nor owners have produced any 
legitimate defense of their claim on the firm’s profits.  Instead, those who 
control the firm “[have] cleared the way for the claims of a group far 
wider than either the owners or the control.  They have placed the 
community in a position to demand that the modern corporation serve 
not alone the owners or the control but all society.”28 
This constitutes an entirely new conception of the role of the 
corporation in society: 
When a convincing system of community obligations is worked out 
and is generally accepted, in that moment the passive property right 
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of today must yield before the larger interests of society. . . .  It is 
conceivable—indeed it seems almost essential if the corporate 
system is to survive—that the “control” of the great corporations 
should develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a 
variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning 
to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy 
rather than private cupidity.29 
The Modern Corporation, then, was a warning shot issued to 
intellectuals and policy makers, notable for its Jeffersonian concerns 
regarding the concentration of power as well as for its willingness to 
raise questions about the larger social role of the corporation.  The large 
corporation had created great wealth and had the potential to be a source 
for enormous good.  It also posed a serious danger, however, in that its 
rise had resulted in a relatively small group of extremely powerful 
organizations led by individuals who were unaccountable to any external 
force.  Without some means by which to reign in these organizations, the 
future of American democracy was in peril. 
II.  SITUATING INTERPRETATIONS IN THEIR HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
In order to understand how various interpretations came to be, some 
historical background is useful.  The large corporation emerged in the 
United States during the period between 1870 and 1900.  The beginning 
of the twentieth century witnessed the formation of the first giant firms 
led by United States Steel, a conglomeration of several existing steel 
companies assembled by J. P. Morgan.30  The great size of these firms 
raised considerable concern among critics, but it was more than their size 
per se that caught people’s attention.31  Of even greater note was the 
extent to which the corporations were connected with one another in a 
web of cross-cutting affiliations.  Morgan and his firm, J. P. Morgan and 
Company, controlled several of the leading railroads as well as U.S. Steel 
and International Harvester, and Morgan and his ally, George F. Baker, 
controlled several of the largest New York banks.32  Meanwhile, 
Morgan’s great rival, John D. Rockefeller, not only controlled the 
Standard Oil Company and several additional firms, but also was allied 
with James Stillman, president of the National City Bank; Jacob Schiff of 
                                                 
 29. Id. at 312–13. 
 30. MARK S. MIZRUCHI, THE AMERICAN CORPORATE NETWORK 1904–1974 18 (1982) 
[hereinafter AM. CORP. NETWORK]. 
 31. See, e.g., Sereno S. Pratt, Who Owns the United States?, 10 WORLD’S WORK 6704, 6714 
(1905); IDA M. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (McClure, Phillips & 
Co. 1904). 
 32. MIZRUCHI, supra note 30, at 134–35. 
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Kuhn, Loeb & Company; and Edward H. Harriman of the Union Pacific 
Railroad.33  Although Morgan and Rockefeller were sometimes viewed 
as rivals,34 their interests came into alignment through an agreement, 
described at the time as a “community of interest,” following the 
destructive fight for control of the Great Northern Railroad.35  This 
community of interest was reflected in the proliferation of director 
interlocks among these firms.  Baker alone sat on the boards of thirty-
eight different corporations in 1904, including several leading banks. 
During this period, social critics, muckraking journalists, and even 
President Theodore Roosevelt railed against this “money trust.”  
Congress held hearings, led by Representative Arsene Pujo of Louisiana.  
Even future Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis entered the fray, 
publishing a series of essays under the title, Other Peoples’ Money, and 
How the Bankers Use It.36  Brandeis was particularly concerned with the 
prevalence of interlocking directorates, pronouncing it to be “the root of 
many evils,” in that it violated “the fundamental law that no man can 
serve two masters.”37  The uproar over the concentrated economic power 
and the cohesive relations among the leading firms culminated with the 
passage of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914. 
This period, roughly 1890 to 1920, has been termed the “era of 
finance capital.”38  There is widespread agreement that the leaders of the 
largest American corporations during this period constituted a basically 
cohesive “capitalist class,” which formed the basis of an American social 
elite, as chronicled by later writers such as Ferdinand Lundberg in 
America’s Sixty Families39 and Anna Rochester in Rulers of America.40  
At the same time, a series of changes had begun during the later part of 
this period that, in the view of many mid-twentieth century observers, led 
to the demise of this class.  Among these changes was Section 8 of the 
Clayton Act, which prohibited director interlocks between firms 
competing in the same market.  The Act sharply reduced the number of 
interlocks among leading firms.  In a study of 167 large U.S. 
corporations, Mizruchi found that the number of interlocks among them 
                                                 
 33. Id. 
 34. VINCENT P. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA (Harvard Univ. Press 1970). 
 35. THOMAS C. COCHRAN & WILLIAM MILLER, THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE (Harper & Row 
1961) (1942). 
 36. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (National 
Home Library Foundation 1933) (1914).  For more on Justice Brandeis, see Harwell Wells, The 
Birth of Corporate Governance, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1247 (2010). 
 37. Id. at 35. 
 38. See COCHRAN & MILLER, supra note 35; CAROSSO, supra note 34. 
 39. FERDINAND LUNDBERG, AMERICA’S SIXTY FAMILIES (Vanguard Press 1937). 
 40. ANNA ROCHESTER, RULERS OF AMERICA, A STUDY OF FINANCIAL CAPITAL (Int’l 
Publishers 1936). 
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declined by more than 25% between 1912 and 1919.41  There was also a 
generational shift, during which the founders of the leading firms of the 
day—including Morgan, Baker, Rockefeller, and Stillman—died or 
retired and were replaced by their sons or hand-picked successors, none 
of whom approached the influence or stature of their predecessors. 
A.  The Modern Corporation as Great American Celebration? 
The Modern Corporation appeared in the early years of the Great 
Depression, and its ominous tone fit well with the grave situation in 
which American society was engulfed.  By the end of World War II, 
however, circumstances were very different.  The United States had 
emerged from the war as the world’s leading economic and military 
power.  The war had ended the Depression, and contrary to the concerns 
of many scholars and policy makers, the economy did not sink back into 
a downturn once the war effort wound down.  Instead, the nation 
experienced an economic expansion that, with only a few relatively 
minor downturns, lasted more than two decades.  During this period, a 
group of prominent scholars presented analyses of American society that 
viewed the nation as the ideal contemporary manifestation of democracy, 
a trend that C. Wright Mills derisively labeled the “curious American 
celebration.”42  And ironically, contrary to the general tenor of Berle and 
Means, The Modern Corporation was often used by scholars of this 
period as evidence of the success of democracy in the United States. 
                                                 
 41. MIZRUCHI, AM. CORP. NETWORK, supra note 30, at 101–02. 
 42. C. Wright Mills, On Knowledge and Power, 2 DISSENT 201, 204 (1955).  The phrase 
typically attributed to Mills (and that we use in the title to this section) is “Great American 
Celebration,” usually capitalized.  Despite an exhaustive search, we have been unable to find any 
reference by Mills himself to the “Great,” as opposed to the “curious,” American celebration.  Paul 
Baran and Paul Sweezy attribute the phrase “Great American Celebration” to Mills on the first page 
of their book, Monopoly Capital, without a specific citation, and the phrase was used by many 
authors thereafter, always attributed to Mills and always without citation.  See PAUL A. BARAN & 
PAUL M. SWEEZY, MONOPOLY CAPITAL (Monthly Review Press 1966).  We suspect that Baran and 
Sweezy might have used the quote from memory, with the slight alteration, and assumed that it was 
not necessary to provide a direct reference.  We did find a pre-Baran and Sweezy reference to the 
term “great American celebration” (with “great” and “celebration” in lower case) in a review of 
three books (including one by Mills) by historian C. Wilson Record.  See C. Wilson Record, Of 
History and Sociology, 11 AM. Q. 425, 429 (1959).  It is possible that Baran and Sweezy had come 
across Record’s use of the term and, given its similarity to Mills’s earlier term, mistakenly attributed 
it to Mills.  Or it is possible that Record himself had read Mills’s earlier article and used a similar 
phrase without reference to Mills.  Regardless of its origins, the subsequent attribution of the term to 
Mills provides an example of a phrase taking on a life of its own, independent of its accuracy, 
another example of the phenomenon discussed by Mizruchi and Fein and described in the 
introduction to this paper.  See Mizruchi & Fein, supra note 1.  Because “Great American 
Celebration” has become the term of choice, we use it, rather than “curious American celebration,” 
in the title to this section. 
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Perhaps the most cited reason for the presumed decline of the 
capitalist class, however, was the separation of ownership from control 
that Berle and Means chronicled.  In fact, by the 1950s, a widely held 
interpretation of Berle and Means’s findings had begun to take hold, one 
that had implications that were very different from those implied by The 
Modern Corporation.  This interpretation, advanced by scholars such as 
Daniel Bell, John Kenneth Galbraith, Talcott Parsons, and David 
Riesman, reflected the view noted earlier that American society had 
become increasingly democratic.43  We will begin by summarizing the 
general contours of this story.  We then take a closer look at some of the 
major individual works that advanced this argument. 
As we noted earlier, Berle and Means documented the growing 
dispersal of stockholdings in large American corporations, which led to 
managers’ increasing power.  Freed from the dictates of stockholders, 
these managers now had increasing autonomy over firm policies.  Given 
the lack of stockholder pressure, managers could reduce dividend 
payouts, thus increasing the amount of available cash.  As Berle 
subsequently argued, the increased level of retained earnings allowed 
managers to reduce their dependence on banks and other financial 
institutions, since it was now possible to finance investment with 
internally generated funds.44  Unlike the managers of the earlier 
generation, the new corporate managers were bureaucrats whose primary 
allegiance was to their own firm rather than to a group of firms under one 
center of control.  This focus on the internal workings of their own firms 
was believed to have led to a decline in cross-firm cohesiveness.  The 
American business community thus became, in Dahrendorf’s words, a 
plurality of “partly agreed, partly competing, and partly simply different 
groups.”45 
This presumed “decomposition of capital,” as Dahrendorf called it, 
had important implications for the viability of American democracy.46  
The economist Joseph Schumpeter, in his 1942 classic, Capitalism, 
Socialism, and Democracy, argued that political life in industrialized 
democratic societies was dominated by a relatively small group of elites, 
while most citizens were largely apathetic about politics.47  Because the 
vibrancy of democracy depends on an engaged public, Schumpeter asked 
                                                 
 43. See BELL, END OF IDEOLOGY, supra note 6; GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM, supra 
note 6; PARSONS, supra note 6; DAVID RIESMAN, THE LONELY CROWD: A STUDY OF THE CHANGING 
AMERICAN CHARACTER (Anchor 1953). 
 44. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 35–41 (Harcourt, 
Brace & World 1954) [hereinafter CAPITALIST REVOLUTION]. 
 45. DAHRENDORF, supra note 6, at 47. 
 46. Id. at 41. 
 47. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942). 
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how it was possible to claim that these societies were democratic in any 
sense of the word.  The answer, he concluded, was that the elites who 
dominated these societies were themselves politically divided.  Although 
one or more segments within this group might be connected to those in 
office, one or more opposing segments—without such connections—
stood as challengers whose candidates had the potential to prevail in 
subsequent elections.  If the public were to become sufficiently 
dissatisfied with the party in office, it had the option of replacing the 
current occupants of power with their opponents.  This occurred in the 
United States in 1932 and, after Schumpeter’s time, in several 
subsequent U.S. presidential elections, including the 1968, 1980, and 
1992 elections.48  The existence of democracy in these societies, 
Schumpeter thus argued, depended on the presence of significant 
divisions within the elite.  Similar arguments were later made by John 
Kenneth Galbraith and Seymour Martin Lipset.49 
But on what basis did these elite divisions occur?  In a 1958 essay, 
political scientist Robert Dahl argued that for a group to be powerful, 
two elements must be present: the group must have an abundance of 
resources on one hand and a high degree of unity on the other.50  Many 
observers, including Dahl and Galbraith, had acknowledged that large 
corporations had a high level of resources.  This meant that to the extent 
that these corporations could maintain any semblance of unity, their 
presence could contain serious consequences for the functioning of 
American democracy.  Galbraith argued, however, that the wide range of 
often-conflicting interests among industries—and among firms within 
industries—created what he called “countervailing power,” in which 
these cross-cutting interests canceled out one another, thereby preventing 
large corporations from constituting themselves as a unified political 
force. 
With its emphasis on stock dispersal and on the rise of bureaucratic 
managers, The Modern Corporation was assumed by several authors to 
provide evidence for the rise of this countervailing power and, therefore, 
for the increasingly democratic character of American society.  A good 
example of this was presented by the great sociological theorist Talcott 
Parsons in a critique of C. Wright Mills’s The Power Elite.51  Mills had 
argued that a relatively small, cohesive group consisting of leaders of 
large corporations, the government, and the military dominated the 
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political life of American society.  In taking issue with this argument, in 
particular with Mills’s depiction of large corporations, Parsons suggested 
that 
[Mills] continues to speak of power within the economy as based on 
property.  To a considerable degree, of course, this is legally true, 
since the legal control of enterprise rests with stockholders.  But, as 
Berle and Means made abundantly clear, very generally it is not 
substantively true.  In the old-style family enterprise, still 
predominant in the small-business sector of the economy, the 
functions of management and ownership are fused in the same 
people.  In the larger enterprise they have by and large become 
differentiated . . . .  In general, property holdings have not, of 
course, been expropriated, except for their diminution through 
inheritance and income taxes . . . .  What has happened is that their 
relation to the power structure of the economy has been greatly 
altered.  Mills almost entirely passes over this change.52 
Parsons’s characterization of Berle and Means’s argument is not 
factually inaccurate.  Berle and Means, and certainly Berle in his later 
writings,53 did indeed argue that the relation between property ownership 
and corporate control had changed.  What differs is Parsons’s use of this 
point.  Parsons criticized Mills for suggesting that power in the corporate 
world was highly concentrated.  He implied, on the contrary, that power 
had become dispersed, and he cited Berle and Means as support.  Yet as 
we have seen, Berle and Means did not argue that power had become 
dispersed.  Instead, they, like Mills, were concerned that corporate power 
had become highly concentrated, and unlike Parsons, they believed that 
the separation of ownership from control had helped further this 
concentration.54 
Of course, Parsons was writing in the late 1950s, nearly three 
decades after The Modern Corporation was published.  And Berle 
himself, in a review in the New York Times,55 offered a critique of Mills’s 
book.  Berle’s criticisms of Mills, however, were based on a very 
different set of arguments.  He did not take issue with Mills’s point that 
there was a high concentration of power in American society.  Rather, 
Berle questioned whether those in power were as amoral as Mills had 
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indicated.  In fairness to Parsons, he did not explicitly attribute to Berle 
and Means the claim that the separation of ownership from control had 
led to a dispersal of power.  The quote above suggests that Parsons did 
imply such a connection, however. 
Parsons was not the only social scientist who made the link 
between the separation of ownership and control and the dispersal of 
power.  Ralf Dahrendorf, as we noted above, drew a similar connection.56  
Consistent with Berle and Means, Dahrendorf argued that the dispersal 
of stock had transformed the relation between property ownership and 
the firm’s administration in contemporary developed societies.  But 
Dahrendorf went further than Berle and Means in describing the 
consequences of this stock dispersal.  For Dahrendorf, the fusion of 
ownership and control was a central component of capitalism.  Because 
this unity had ruptured and because those who controlled the firm were 
now mere bureaucrats as opposed to entrepreneurs, Dahrendorf argued 
that the separation of ownership from control had ushered forth the end 
of capitalism and made way for a new, “post-capitalist” society.57  The 
capitalist class posited by Marx in the nineteenth century had given way 
to a class of career bureaucrats, whose primary loyalty lay with their 
employer rather than with a class of property owners.  This provided the 
basis for Dahrendorf’s claim, cited above, that “[c]apital—and thereby 
capitalism—[had] dissolved and given way, in the economic sphere, to a 
plurality of partly agreed, partly competing, and partly simply different 
groups.”58  Because this plurality of cross-cutting groups rendered unity 
among corporations extremely difficult, if not impossible, Dahrendorf’s 
discussion suggests that business would be unable to constitute itself as a 
singularly powerful political actor.  As with Parsons, then, Dahrendorf 
used Berle and Means’s findings to argue that corporate power had 
become increasingly dispersed in American society, exactly the opposite 
conclusion from that drawn, or at least suggested, in The Modern 
Corporation. 
Ironically, even a Marxist critic of The Modern Corporation, 
Maurice Zeitlin, appears to have missed Berle and Means’s concerns 
about the potential concentration of power wrought by the rise of the 
large corporation.59  Zeitlin is for the most part faithful to the text of The 
Modern Corporation.  In fact, his account is far more detailed than most 
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of the more celebratory citations of the book.  Nevertheless, in focusing 
exclusively on Berle and Means’s analysis of ownership and control, 
Zeitlin neglects to mention the authors’ concerns regarding the 
concentration of economic power.  This omission, combined with his 
numerous quotations from authors who used The Modern Corporation as 
evidence for the dispersal of power in American society, gives the 
impression that Berle and Means themselves shared this conclusion.  One 
possible reason that Zeitlin ignores Berle and Means’s concerns about 
the concentration of power may be that he is more focused on the 
interpreters of Berle and Means than on the original work itself, and his 
emphasis is on their arguments about the dispersal of power.60  A second 
possible reason is that Zeitlin is concerned with making the case for a 
particular view, in which power is held by a property-owning class that 
exercises its control through its ownership of corporations.  This is 
reflected in the fact that even other Marxist analysts, such as Baran and 
Sweezy,61 come under criticism from Zeitlin for accepting Berle and 
Means’s conclusion on the separation of ownership from control.  
Whatever the reason, the fact that Zeitlin does not address Berle and 
Means’s statements on the concentration of corporate power leaves the 
impression, even if unintended, that they were not concerned about this 
issue.  Yet regardless of the views of scholars such as Bell, Dahrendorf, 
and Parsons, it seems clear that Berle and Means themselves were not 
participants in an uncritical “celebration” of American society.  On the 
contrary, they offered a considerably more cautious appraisal, based on a 
genuine concern with the potentially unchecked power of the large 
American corporation. 
B.  The Modern Corporation as Social Criticism 
Although some scholars used The Modern Corporation as evidence 
for the dispersal of power and the spread of democracy in American 
society, others were more cognizant of the critical aspects of the work 
and provided a more nuanced interpretation.  A good example of this is 
in American Capitalism by John Kenneth Galbraith.62  Aware that the 
massive government spending on World War II had lifted the United 
States out of the Great Depression, many scholars and policy makers 
were concerned that once the war ended, the nation would again 
experience a major economic collapse.  This collapse did not occur, 
however, and Galbraith’s book was an attempt to understand why.  
                                                 
 60. Id. at 1074–80. 
 61. BARAN & SWEEZY, supra note 42. 
 62. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM, supra note 6. 
1080 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:4 
Galbraith began by suggesting that the American economy had left 
behind the system of competitive capitalism and had instead become a 
system dominated by a relatively small number of large corporations. 
Unlike authors such as Dahrendorf and Parsons, Galbraith drew 
upon The Modern Corporation as evidence of economic concentration.63  
In fact, Galbraith did not even make an explicit reference to the 
separation of ownership from control, although he did imply its existence 
when discussing the role of managers in administering firms.  
Interestingly, however, Galbraith did ultimately conclude that corporate 
power is limited.64  Labor unions, the government, and even consumers 
have the ability to exercise constraints on the actions of firms, Galbraith 
argued.  This suggests that countervailing power had its sources in 
sectors outside as well as inside the business community, a point that 
Berle himself made by drawing on Galbraith in one of his later works.65  
Interestingly, then, the situation that Berle and Means envisioned, in 
which corporations answer to elements of the larger society—what in 
contemporary terms are referred to as “stakeholders”—had, according to 
Galbraith, become a reality by the early 1950s.  In that sense, Galbraith 
may have also contributed to the optimism about the nature of American 
society in the postwar era, even as he acknowledged the critical nature of 
The Modern Corporation. 
Yet, by the late 1960s, Galbraith had become more cautious in his 
praise and more radical in his conclusions.  In The New Industrial State, 
he argued not only that control was no longer in the hands of owners, but 
also that it no longer resided with managers.66  Instead, he suggested that 
effective control was now in the hands of a “technostructure”—those 
“who bring specialized knowledge, talent or experience to group 
decision-making.”67  “This [technostructure], not the management,” 
Galbraith argued, “is the guiding intelligence—the brain—of the 
enterprise.”68  Building on a theme that Berle69 and others had discussed, 
Galbraith argued that because the ownership of capital had become 
increasingly irrelevant in industrialized societies, in many respects, the 
economies of the United States and the Soviet Union had increasingly 
come to resemble one another.  Both economies were characterized by 
significant central planning.  Indeed, Galbraith and Berle both made 
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reference to the central role of the government in American economic 
policy.  And in both societies, producers were relatively insulated from 
the market. 
Galbraith and Berle also argued, along with Dahrendorf and others, 
that the entrepreneur played little role in the American economy during 
the 1950s and 1960s.70  Perhaps Galbraith’s most interesting reference to 
Berle and Means, however, was his observation on the relation between 
corporations and the state.  Galbraith suggested that for Berle and Means, 
as corporate power became increasingly unchecked, it would be 
necessary for the state to appropriate power from the managers.71  
Galbraith even went so far as to label Berle a socialist: 
This formidable conclusion [regarding the possible need for the 
state to appropriate power], which was expressed in guarded terms, 
came toward the end of a long book.  It seems to have been 
overlooked.  Had his numerous critics been more diligent, Professor 
Berle’s early commitment to socialism would, one imagines, have 
been more celebrated during his long and greatly distinguished 
public career.72 
We believe that Galbraith likely exaggerated, or at least 
misrepresented, Berle and Means’s argument here.  In our reading, Berle 
and Means maintained that it might be advantageous for corporations to 
be run in the interests of a range of stakeholders, including labor, 
consumers, and the larger community, but they did not suggest that 
corporations be controlled by the state.  Nevertheless, Galbraith’s 
interpretation represents an example of the extent to which Berle and 
Means’s own critical perspective was evident to those who gave the book 
a close reading. 
Another innovative application of the ideas in The Modern 
Corporation was provided by Daniel Bell.  Our praise of Bell in this 
context may be ironic to some readers, considering that Zeitlin criticized 
Bell for uncritically accepting the idea of the dissolution of the capitalist 
class in the early twentieth century.73  In The End of Ideology, Bell did 
indeed argue that family capitalism in the United States had generally 
disappeared, at least among the largest corporations.74  He also accepted 
Galbraith’s concept of countervailing power and issued a biting critique 
of Mills’s The Power Elite, arguing, similar to Dahrendorf and Parsons, 
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that the decline of family capitalism contributed to the dissolution of 
corporate power.75  In a subsequent work, however, Bell charted a new 
direction that acknowledged the concerns that Berle and Means had 
originally raised.76 
Bell’s primary focus in this work, The Coming of Post-Industrial 
Society, was on the social ramifications of the shift in the American 
economy from one based on manufacturing to one based primarily on 
service.77  Included in his discussion was a critique of the idea, 
expounded most notably by Milton Friedman, that, as Bell put it, 
“individual satisfaction is the unit in which costs and benefits are to be 
reckoned.”78  Bell argues that this view “reflects the utilitarian fallacy 
that the sum total of individual decisions is equivalent to a social 
decision.”79  Bell proposes what he terms the “sociologizing” mode as an 
alternative: “the effort to judge society’s needs in a more conscious 
fashion.”80  He argues that as we move into post-industrial society, the 
value of a corporation will increasingly be based on the extent to which it 
responds to the needs of its full set of stakeholders. 
Although Bell does not refer to The Modern Corporation in this 
work, he does mention the oft-cited debate between Berle81 and Merrick 
Dodd82 regarding to whom the corporation is responsible.83  Ironically, as 
will be well-known to readers of this journal, it was Dodd who argued 
for the stakeholder view of the firm in this debate.  Berle’s concern was 
that in the absence of a “clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of 
responsibilities,” management would be able to act in its own interests 
and then arbitrarily identify one or more stakeholders as the presumed 
beneficiaries of management’s actions.  Of course, Berle subsequently 
came to accept Dodd’s view, and both positions served as an important 
reference point for Bell.  So despite his seeming acceptance of Berle and 
Means’s “dispersal of power” interpretation, Bell ultimately came to 
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embrace the need to reign in the corporation—a position much closer to 
the concerns raised in the later chapters of The Modern Corporation. 
III.  BUT PERHAPS THEY WERE RIGHT 
We have seen that there were two broad interpretations of The 
Modern Corporation that led to two very different conceptions of the 
role of the large corporation.  On one hand, in a view seemingly closer to 
Berle and Means’s original concerns, there were authors who focused on 
the dangers of concentrated economic power wrought by the 
concentration of industry and the lack of accountability of management.  
On the other hand, there were those who saw the separation of ownership 
from control as the source of the dispersal of corporate power and the 
consequent further democratization of American society.  One question 
we need to ask is whether these two interpretations are compatible.  A 
second question is whether either, or both, turned out to be historically 
accurate. 
We believe that the two views indeed are compatible but not 
because we believe that corporate power actually became dispersed by 
the mid-twentieth century.  Instead, we argue that while power among 
large corporations remained highly concentrated, a series of institutional 
factors compelled corporate leaders to act in ways that were, if not 
completely socially responsible, at least relatively benign compared to 
the standards of the twenty-first century.  We believe that the concept of 
countervailing power, as applied to the relations between corporations 
and non-business actors, provides a generally tenable description of the 
situation that prevailed in the postwar period.  To make this case, we 
begin by providing a brief historical account of the political ideology of 
American business executives.  We then describe the three 
countervailing forces that we believe placed constraints on the actions of 
large corporations during this period: the state, organized labor, and the 
financial community.  Finally, we describe the forces that contributed to 
the breakdown of this arrangement and the consequences this breakdown 
had for the current status of American corporate managers. 
A.  Corporate Ideology and the Countervailing Powers that Compelled 
Moderate Corporate Behavior 
1.  The Ideology and Behavior of American Corporate Leaders 
There is widespread agreement that the vast majority of American 
business executives have historically held political views that would, 
1084 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:4 
under today’s labels, be termed “conservative.”84  These views include 
support for free markets, suspicion of government intervention in the 
economy, support for low individual and corporate taxes, and opposition 
to organized labor.  They have been reflected in businesspeople’s 
consistently strong support for the Republican Party.  They were 
reflected in businesspeople’s widespread opposition to the New Deal 
reforms of the 1930s.  And, they were reflected in support for the turn 
toward free market policies that began in the late 1970s and continued 
into the twenty-first century. 
Despite the support for these conservative ideas among most 
American businesspeople, there has been a subset of American 
executives that held more moderate views since at least the early 1900s.  
The National Civic Federation, formed in 1900, consisted of prominent 
business leaders, labor leaders, academics, and politicians, all of whom 
were dedicated to finding solutions for the most deleterious 
consequences of free-market capitalism.85  The corporate executives in 
this group never constituted more than a small percentage of the 
corporate leaders of the day, however, and the organization had become 
greatly weakened by the 1920s.  This group nevertheless provided 
evidence that there were some corporate officials who saw a need for 
both private firms and the state to take a more active role in providing 
basic social services for workers.  Many of the ideas proposed by this 
group were eventually adopted as welfare policies by private firms and 
also became the basis of New Deal reforms during the 1930s. 86 
A similar group of relatively moderate corporate leaders emerged in 
the period after World War II.  Centered in organizations such as the 
Committee for Economic Development and the Council on Foreign 
Relations, these business executives were associated primarily with the 
largest corporations and financial institutions, and they tended to sit on 
the boards of two or more firms.87  In contrast with most American 
businesspeople, these leaders held a relatively broad, cosmopolitan 
orientation, in which they sought to reach an accommodation with 
members of alternative sectors of the society.  This included limited 
acceptance of the right of labor unions to engage in collective bargaining, 
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a similarly limited acknowledgement of the occasional value of 
government regulation of the economy, and cautious support for civil 
rights and anti-poverty legislation.88 
Considerable debate exists regarding the extent to which these 
views reflected a set of ideological beliefs or a pragmatic response to 
reality.89  There is some evidence that the beliefs were in fact genuine.  
In a survey of 120 leading corporate executives conducted in 1971, Allen 
Barton found widespread support for Keynesian deficit spending, for 
federal antipoverty programs, and for the idea that the government 
should provide jobs when the private economy is unable to do so.90  
Regardless of whether these views reflected deeply held convictions, 
they at least indicated that many of the leading corporate executives were 
willing to adopt a pragmatic approach toward policy. 
This relatively moderate strategy of the leading corporations was 
held in place, we argue, by three countervailing forces: (1) a relatively 
powerful and active state; (2) a relatively powerful and well-organized 
labor movement; and (3) a financial community capable of mediating 
conflicts of interest among firms and disciplining recalcitrant individual 
capitalists.  We turn now to a discussion of these forces. 
2.  The State 
Prior to the Great Depression, the government played a relatively 
minor role in the American economy.91  The Federal Reserve System, 
which was not established until 1913, handled monetary policy, and 
various regulations had been passed in the late 1800s, including the 
Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act.  It was not until 
the 1930s, however, that the government began to play a significant 
direct role in the economy.  By the postwar period, programs such as 
Social Security and financial regulations imposed by the Glass–Steagall 
Act, which forced commercial and investment banks to separate, and the 
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Securities Exchange Act, which created the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, had become taken-for-granted aspects of the institutional 
landscape.92  The state’s most important role beginning in the 1930s, 
however, was the introduction of Keynesian fiscal policy, in which the 
government used tax and spending measures, including deficit spending, 
in an attempt to ensure economic stability. 
Keynesian theory was based in part on the idea that developed 
capitalist societies had a built-in tendency for aggregate demand to lag 
behind production.  Without some way to increase demand, the economy 
would sink into a recession or, if the gap was sufficiently severe, a 
depression.  Through policies such as Social Security, welfare, and the 
largest element of the budget—military expenditures—the state helped 
increase demand, thus heading off the threat of a depression.93  Although 
some government social policies ran counter to the free market ideology 
of most businesspeople, the enormous economic success that the United 
States experienced in the postwar period tended to minimize opposition 
to these policies.  In fact, dating from the 1930s, there were significant 
numbers of leading business figures who accepted the idea that the 
government would play a significant role in the economy.94  This 
approach reached its culmination with the formation of the Committee 
for Economic Development (CED) in 1942.  As Robert Collins notes, 
this group reflected policies similar to those of the earlier National Civic 
Federation, with an emphasis on cooperation among business, 
government, and labor.95  The CED attempted to address economic and 
social problems through technical expertise rather than political 
ideology, and its members supported a significant and growing role for 
the federal government, including the idea of government support to 
maintain high levels of employment—a view echoed in the responses to 
Barton’s survey three decades later.96  The influence of the CED and 
other groups of leading businesspeople, a more broadly liberal-political 
atmosphere, and the economic success experienced by the United States 
in the postwar period fed the continued adherence to Keynesian 
economic policies through both Democratic and Republican 
administrations.  By the turn of the 1970s, these policies had become so 
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widely accepted that President Nixon remarked, in 1971, that “I am now 
a Keynesian in economics.”97 
In addition to its role in stabilizing the economy, beginning in the 
1930s, the state also became increasingly involved in regulating business 
practices.  First and foremost among these regulations was the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, which established the minimum wage, rules for 
overtime pay, and restrictions on the use of child labor.98  The 
government also involved itself in the regulation of several industries, 
including oil, sugar, and transportation.  In such cases, the industries 
themselves either sought or supported regulation as a means of ensuring 
a level playing field and of preventing disruptive behavior—a point that 
Berle noted in one of his later works.99  Through both its economic and 
regulatory policies, then, the state imposed constraints that contributed to 
the moderate political strategy adopted by the American corporate elite. 
3.  Labor 
Although management and workers share similar interests in certain 
respects—both have an interest in the survival and prosperity of the firm, 
for example—it has long been acknowledged that they have opposing 
interests in other respects.  There are few American corporations that, 
other things being equal, would prefer that their workers be organized, 
and management has both resisted the formation of unions and attempted 
to weaken them once formed.  Nevertheless, there have been periods in 
which some corporate officials have been willing to accommodate 
unions, especially in cases in which alternative courses of action were 
seen as even more objectionable.  In the early 1900s, for example, when 
the prospect of socialism was a genuine concern to American business 
leaders, some firms were willing to accept unions that were more 
moderate.  The American Federation of Labor gained its initial foothold 
precisely in response to these conditions.100 
The 1930s witnessed a broad increase in unionization in the 
American business world, and the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 
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increased unions’ ability to organize.101  Given labor shortages during the 
war, unions became increasingly militant, and strike activity increased 
sharply.  By 1950, there were 424 work stoppages in the Unites States, 
involving nearly 1.7 million workers.102  The number rose to a high of 
more than 2.7 million workers in 1952.103  Increasingly concerned with 
the lost work time resulting from this worker militancy, some large firms 
reached agreements with their unions to limit the number of disruptions.  
These agreements, typified by the 1950 “Treaty of Detroit” involving 
General Motors and the United Auto Workers, became known as the 
“capital–labor accord.”104  As Bowles et al. put it: 
Corporations would retain absolute control over the essential 
decisions governing enterprise operations—decisions involving 
production, technology, plant location, investment, and 
marketing . . . .  In return, unions were accepted as legitimate 
representatives of workers’ interests.  They were expected to 
bargain on behalf of labor’s immediate economic interests, but not 
to challenge employer control of enterprises . . . .  Unions would 
help maintain an orderly and disciplined labor force while 
corporations would reward workers with a share of the income 
gains made possible by rising productivity, with greater 
employment security, and with improved working conditions.105 
In other words, corporations were willing to accept the existence of 
unions, along with higher wages and benefits, in return for labor peace 
and control of the work process. 
There has been renewed debate among labor historians regarding 
whether the capital–labor accord ever existed.  Several scholars argue 
that business not only continued to aggressively fight labor during this 
period, but that American corporations never accepted the legitimacy of 
unions.106  Rather, as McIntyre and Hillard suggest, business and labor at 
most reached a partial truce rather than a genuine accord.107 
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We agree that there are reasons to doubt the extent to which 
employers internalized ideas about the acceptance of labor unions.  We 
also believe, however, that whether this accord reflected deeply held 
attitudes toward unions is beside the point.  Just as the corporate support 
for certain Keynesian economic policies reflected a pragmatic adaptation 
to a seemingly immutable reality, the acceptance of collective bargaining 
also reflected an understanding that unions were a basic component of 
business life, even if they were undesirable.  Certainly unions could be 
fought, just as government redistributive economic policies could arouse 
opposition.  Given unions’ existence, however, many corporate leaders 
reasoned that it was preferable to make their peace with them. 
4.  The Financial Community 
In addition to government and labor, the financial community also 
contributed to the relatively moderate stance of the postwar corporate 
elite by serving as a meeting place for its leading members.  
Commentators from future Justice Brandeis to Daniel Bell noted the 
central role played by major banks and insurance companies in the early 
twentieth century.108  As these authors noted, the banks, led by J. P. 
Morgan, George F. Baker, and others, were the most powerful 
corporations of the era. 
Most observers believed that banks’ power waned after the 
Depression, however.  First, the Glass–Steagall Act of 1933 forced 
commercial and investment banks to separate their functions, 
significantly weakening both groups.109  Second, as several authors 
argued, nonfinancial corporations, especially after the war, became 
increasingly able to finance their investments with retained earnings.  
Thus, nonfinancial corporations reduced their dependence on banks, and 
the banks’ power was further reduced.  This latter point ultimately came 
under dispute.  In a study of corporations’ use of external financing 
between 1925 and 1955, John Lintner found that the level of external 
financing had remained virtually constant during the period,110 and a 
subsequent study by Linda Stearns revealed that the level of external 
financing actually increased beginning in the mid-1960s and remained 
high into the early 1980s.111  Still, by the postwar period, it was difficult 
                                                 
 108. BRANDEIS, supra note 36; BELL, END OF IDEOLOGY, supra note 6. 
 109. Banking Act (Glass–Steagall Act), ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (repealed 1999). 
 110. John Lintner, The Financing of Corporations, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 
166 (Edward Mason ed., 1959). 
 111. Linda Brewster Stearns, Capital Market Effects on External Control of Corporations, 15 
THEORY & SOC. 47, 53 (1986).  Of course, the mere use of external funding does not necessarily 
mean that corporations are dependent upon it.  Firms may borrow when interest rates are low or for 
tax benefits, even when suitable alternatives exist.  In a study of twenty-two large firms between 
1090 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:4 
to argue that banks exercised control over nonfinancial corporations in 
the way that J. P. Morgan and others had done at the turn of the century. 
The banks nevertheless continued to play an important role.  Even 
if nonfinancial corporations were not ultimately dependent on them for 
capital, the banks were uniquely positioned to provide information and 
advice because they were “industry-neutral.”  That is, they had no reason 
to favor any particular industry over another, except on the basis of 
which investment would produce the highest overall return for the 
system as a whole.112  Perhaps as a result of this factor, the major 
commercial banks, the leading insurance companies, and significant 
lenders of capital were consistently the most central nodes in the 
networks created by director interlocks among firms from the early 
twentieth century through the 1970s.113 
Although it is difficult to conclusively demonstrate, there is 
evidence to suggest that the banks, while rarely exercising control over 
firms, played a moderating influence during the postwar period.114  This 
was evident in the widely discussed case in which Saul P. Steinberg, an 
entrepreneur and the head of Leasco, attempted to acquire Chemical 
Bank, one of the six leading New York money-market banks, in 1968.  
Within two weeks of Steinberg announcing his bid, Leasco’s stock had 
dropped by nearly 30%, and it continued to drop in the following weeks, 
thus ending Steinberg’s bid.  A primary reason for the decline of 
Leasco’s stock price was that the trust departments of the six major New 
York banks—Chemical and its five competitors—all held stock in 
Leasco and all simultaneously sold their Leasco stock after Steinberg’s 
announcement of his bid.115  This event provides an illustration of the 
way in which banks were occasionally willing to intercede to discipline 
what they viewed as recalcitrant individual capitalists. 
B.  The Modern Corporation and the Postwar Accommodation 
The above description of the postwar corporate elite suggests two 
things: on one hand, the power of large corporations may in fact have 
become highly concentrated, just as Berle and Means had feared; on the 
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other hand, the constraints faced by large corporations created a situation 
in which corporate leaders behaved in a relatively moderate, even 
socially responsible, fashion.  To the extent that the latter was the case, it 
suggests that the postwar interpreters—scholars such as Bell, 
Dahrendorf, and Galbraith—had identified a genuine feature of the 
American corporate landscape.  And we shall argue that this was indeed 
the case.  However much any of these authors may have selectively 
interpreted, or even distorted, the writings of Berle and Means, the 
picture that they painted of the post-World War II United States was 
largely accurate.  We acknowledge that this is a potentially controversial 
argument.  It is one that we believe is supported by the evidence, 
however. 
Our case begins with Zeitlin’s critique of the argument for the 
separation of ownership from control.116  Although Zeitlin takes issue 
with Berle and Means, his primary targets are the mid-twentieth century 
sociologists, such as Bell, Dahrendorf, and Parsons, who used Berle and 
Means’s findings to argue that the capitalist class had dissolved.117  As 
we saw, these observers were willing to acknowledge that American 
society had a generally cohesive group of leading businesspeople at the 
turn of the twentieth century, but they argued that this group had 
disappeared over time as power and property were decoupled.  The 
Modern Corporation, with its data on stock dispersal, was used as the 
empirical foundation for these arguments.  In criticizing Berle and 
Means’s findings, Zeitlin called into question the extent to which 
ownership and control had in fact become separated.  To do this, Zeitlin 
returned to the detailed table in The Modern Corporation118 in which 
Berle and Means provided a list of the 200 corporations in their analysis, 
the size of their largest stockholders, the source of their information, and 
their classification of the firm.  It was this table from which Berle and 
Means concluded that 88.5 of the 200 largest American nonfinancial 
corporations could be classified as management-controlled.119  Zeitlin 
showed, however, that for nearly half of the firms in Berle and Means’s 
table, the authors were admittedly unable to locate a significant owning 
interest, and thus, they classified the firm as “presumably” under 
management control.  Zeitlin concluded that Berle and Means had 
demonstrated a clear basis for management control in only 22% of their 
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firms, as opposed to the 44% figure that the authors themselves 
ultimately provided.120 
Regardless of the questions that might have been raised about Berle 
and Means’s findings, one would think that the argument had been put to 
rest three decades later in a study by Robert Larner.121  Using a more 
stringent criterion for management control, Larner found that 84% of the 
200 largest U.S. nonfinancial corporations could be classified as 
management-controlled. 122  This finding, which was cited by Berle and 
Means themselves in the 1968 reissue of their book, suggested to Larner 
that the managerial revolution was “close to complete.”123 
Any set of results that relies on an arbitrary metric for identifying 
management control can, of course, be challenged—a point that Berle 
and Means were clear to note.  Zeitlin, citing studies by Robert 
Sheehan,124 Philip Burch,125 and others, argued that Larner’s findings 
themselves could be called into question.126  Sheehan, an editor of 
Fortune, for example, was able to identify fifty-two firms among the 500 
largest American nonfinancials that Larner had classified as 
management-controlled that in fact were more likely controlled by 
owners.  Although this may appear to be an impressive refutation of 
Larner’s findings, one could argue that it had little impact on his general 
conclusion.  Larner had found that ninety-five, or 19%, of the 500 largest 
U.S. nonfinancial firms were owner-controlled.  When Sheehan’s 
additional fifty-two firms are added to the tally, the proportion of owner-
controlled firms increases to 29.4%.  This hardly stands as strong 
evidence for widespread owner control.127 
Similarly, Burch argued that 45% of the 300 largest manufacturing 
and mining corporations could be classified as “probably” family-
controlled, and an additional 15% could be considered “possibly” family-
controlled.  His criteria for control, however—a 4%–5% stockholding 
and representation on the board of directors over time—are at least as 
open to question as Larner’s, a point that Zeitlin concedes.128  And even 
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if we accept Burch’s suggested 5% proportion of ownership sufficient for 
control, a level also used by the 1968 report of the House Banking and 
Currency Committee chaired by Representative Wright Patman,129 it 
remains undeniable that the dispersal of stock had advanced significantly 
since Berle and Means’s study.130 
What Zeitlin is especially concerned about, however, is the idea 
that stock dispersal led to the decomposition of the capitalist class.  His 
attempt to show that property ownership and corporate control have 
remained fused, or at least to raise questions about the claim that they 
have become separated, is driven by his view that there remains a 
propertied class in American society.  This class, according to Zeitlin, 
exercises control over not only the economy but also the larger political 
life of the society through its ownership of corporations.  This view, if 
not fully apparent in his 1974 article, became more explicit in his 1976 
response to a critique of his article by Michael Allen.131  One could 
certainly raise the question of whether ownership and control have 
become reconnected in the United States in recent decades, as some 
argued occurred during the acquisition wave of the 1980s.132  Berle 
himself, in an extraordinarily prescient discussion,133 raised the 
possibility that the growing presence of institutional stockholders would 
lead to a resurgence of owner control, or at least, to control by 
institutions.  His point anticipated a concern that is now widespread by 
several decades.134  These “great banks and pension funds,” as Berle put 
it, 
[b]uy securities in corporations; thus far they have ordinarily leaned 
over backward in not entering the management of the companies 
whose securities they buy.  But it does not follow at all that as their 
assets continue to grow (they do) and their holdings of securities of 
operating corporations continue to increase (as they inevitably 
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must) that they can indefinitely remain spectators of the 
corporations whose stock and bonds furnish the vehicle for their 
investments.135 
Still, whatever the current role of institutional stockholders, we believe 
that Zeitlin’s critique is misplaced.  We maintain instead (1) that it is not 
necessary to demonstrate a fusion of ownership and control to 
demonstrate the existence of a cohesive corporate community; and (2) 
that such a group did in fact exist in the postwar United States; but (3) 
that the basis of this cohesive corporate community was in the 
corporation, per se, not as Zeitlin argued, in an owning class.  In this 
sense, Bell and the other mid-century authors were incorrect to argue that 
the business community had become completely fragmented.  These 
authors were largely correct, however, in their characterization of 
postwar American capitalism as relatively benign.  The pragmatic, 
forward-looking segment of the corporate elite that we described earlier, 
and that was cited by Bell, did in fact represent a qualitatively different 
approach to business political action—one that, while relatively short-
lived (from the end of the war into the early 1970s), was in fact 
consistent with a broadening of democracy in the United States.  In other 
words, we argue that a relatively cohesive corporate elite did indeed exist 
in the postwar United States and that this elite did in fact act with a 
relatively high degree of concern for the larger community within which 
business operated. 
This group was based not on property ownership, however, but on 
the structural interdependence that existed both among the largest firms 
and between these firms and their external environment, as represented 
by the state, organized labor, and the banks.  We agree with Cheffins and 
Bank136 that the separation of ownership from control during this period 
was real.  As thinkers from Galbraith137 to the Marxist economists Baran 
and Sweezy138 argued, organizational position was now more important 
than ownership of capital.  Those at the helm of the largest corporations 
were at the centers of power.  And with this power came the resources to 
allow them to be concerned with issues beyond those of their own firms.  
The high performance of their firms, the security of their positions, and 
the high levels of autonomy that these corporate officials experienced 
also allowed them to operate with a long-term perspective.  This “golden 
age” of management, with its pragmatic accommodation to labor unions 
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and the state, prevailed from the end of World War II into the early 
1970s. 
Our aim is not to romanticize this period.  This was the era of the 
Vietnam War—a major foreign policy disaster brought on and 
perpetuated by a series of mishaps by the elites who surrounded 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson,139 as well as enormous social turmoil 
domestically.  Yet the American economy was relatively strong during 
this period.  The distribution of income became more equal, as the nation 
witnessed the rise of a middle class.140  Although African-Americans 
continued to lag far behind whites and continued to face high levels of 
discrimination, there was progress as well.  Civil rights became fully 
encoded in law, if not in practice.141  Universal medical care for the 
elderly and the poor was established, which provided increased economic 
security for a large segment of the population.142  And changes in social 
mores significantly expanded freedom of expression as repressive norms 
were turned aside. 
Alongside these changes was a corporate elite that exhibited 
concern for societal well-being in a way that was, if not historically 
unique in its existence, unique in its scope.  Although corporate leaders 
continued to oppose labor unions and government regulation, they were 
also willing to support Keynesian economic policies and greater attention 
to social problems, including education, poverty, and civil rights.  A 
good example of this approach is provided by Bell,143 who quoted a 1971 
article in Fortune describing the views of Alden W. Clausen, the CEO of 
the Bank of America, the nation’s largest bank at the time: “[Clausen’s] 
thoughts turn often to: how to alleviate if not cure the blight now 
spreading at Hunter’s Point and south of Market Street [in San 
Francisco]; how to crack the city’s hard-core unemployment; how to 
cope with student unrest at Berkeley or down the peninsula at 
Stanford.”144 
Berle, in his critique of Mills’s The Power Elite,145 raised a similar 
point.  “Some . . . corporate executives . . . do act as Mills records.  
Others run museums of modern art, foreign aid programs, [and] civic 
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services.”146  Some authors went even further.  Carl Kaysen, for example, 
argued that the modern firm, shorn of the need to maximize profit, had 
become a “soulful corporation” whose managers were driven to do good 
by their personal identification with the firm and its employees.147  It was 
not necessary to go that far, of course.  As the Fortune article that Bell 
quoted suggests, there were entirely pragmatic reasons for corporate 
executives to be concerned with the social problems of the time.  Still, 
these concerns were real, and they were reflected in the corporate 
behavior of the period. 
The rise of management that Berle and Means described, then, may 
have led to a concentration of power among the heads of the largest 
corporations.  As the postwar interpreters of The Modern Corporation 
suggested, however, it also created a corporate elite that, if not altruistic, 
at least saw itself as having an obligation to society that went beyond 
simple maximization of return to stockholders.  In that sense, Berle and 
Means’s worst fears seemed to have been averted. 
IV.  THE BREAKDOWN OF THE POSTWAR CONSENSUS 
This situation did not last, however.  As we moved into the 1970s, 
the United States experienced a confluence of events that began to create 
fissures in the postwar social contract.  Most of these problems were 
economic in nature, but they came from varied sources and were driven 
in some cases by political events. 
The American economy experienced significant growth in the 
1960s, but government spending, driven by the simultaneous occurrence 
of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs and the Vietnam War, led 
to an upsurge of inflation by the end of the decade.  This increase 
accelerated during the 1970s.  Meanwhile, American manufacturers for 
the first time since the end of the war began to experience significant 
competition from foreign producers.148  The balance of trade became 
increasingly unfavorable, to the point that President Nixon eventually 
abandoned the postwar Bretton Woods agreement, which had pegged 
international exchange rates to the dollar.149  To compound matters, oil 
producing nations sharply increased the price of oil in 1973, which 
plunged the American economy into a severe recession.  Unlike earlier 
recessions, however, in which inflation declined as unemployment rose, 
the nation experienced an unprecedented simultaneous increase in both 
                                                 
 146. Berle, Are the Blind Leading the Blind?, supra note 55, at 22. 
 147. Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation, 47 AM. ECON. REV. 
311, 314 (1957). 
 148. DAVID VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES (1989). 
 149. FRED L. BLOCK, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DISORDER (1977). 
2010] The Modern Corporation as Social Construction 1097 
unemployment and inflation.  The inverse relationship between these two 
indicators was a fundamental component of Keynesian economics.  The 
fact that policymakers could no longer assume that a recession would 
reduce inflation created considerable consternation.  In the midst of these 
economic problems, the nation was also experiencing the Watergate 
scandal, which, along with the residue from the social conflicts around 
the Vietnam War, created a significant crisis of legitimacy among major 
American institutions.  Polling data from the period indicated that the 
proportion of Americans who trusted major societal institutions, 
including business and government, was at a historic low.150  Finally, the 
establishment of two major regulatory agencies, the Environmental 
Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, both signed into law by President Nixon, turned 
corporations increasingly against what they viewed as government 
intrusion. 
In the midst of these crises, corporations saw themselves, and even 
capitalism as a system, under siege.  In response, they organized 
politically and mounted a significant counteroffensive.  This movement 
has been well-documented by others from a broad range of perspectives, 
and it is not our purpose to recount these events.151  Some aspects of 
these events warrant mention, however.  Among the most important of 
these was the formation of a new group, the Business Roundtable, 
consisting of the CEOs of the largest American corporations.152  This 
movement also involved the establishment or expansion of funding for 
conservative think tanks.153  What distinguished both the Business 
Roundtable and these newly ascendant research organizations were two 
things: First, unlike the Committee for Economic Development and the 
Council on Foreign Relations, the Roundtable consisted exclusively of 
businesspeople.  Second, these foundations, including the American 
Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation, were distinguished by 
their explicit focus on advocacy research.  This stands in contrast to the 
Brookings Institution, the Conference Board, and other foundations that 
had received funding from corporations but had been devoted to the use 
of value-free social science, in the hope that an unbiased understanding 
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of social and political issues would serve corporate leaders in their 
decision making.  The goal of these new groups was to advocate pro-
business political positions, without any pretense to objectivity.154 
Thus, business groups during the 1970s took on an increasingly 
conservative tone.  They focused on two issues: the excessive regulation 
imposed by government and restrictive rules imposed by labor unions.  
Both of these constraints were seen as reducing productivity.  In response 
to the increasingly ineffective Keynesian approach to economic policy, a 
rising group of critics, mostly from outside the academic world, began to 
focus not on the lack of demand and ways to counteract it—the 
traditional Keynesian concern—but rather on the lack of supply, which 
was seen as a chief cause of inflation.  Lack of supply was in turn viewed 
as a function of the low productivity triggered by government and 
labor.155 
By the late 1970s, this corporate offensive had experienced 
increasing success.  In 1978, an intense lobbying effort by American 
businesses was able to overcome an attempt to weaken the strongly anti-
labor Taft–Hartley Act, an outcome that shocked not only unions, which 
had assumed a victory given the Democratic President and Congress, but 
also members of Congress, the news media, and even the corporations 
themselves.156  Similarly, corporations were able to defeat a proposed 
Consumer Protection Agency in the same year.  Even before Ronald 
Reagan’s election in 1980, business had already experienced significant 
victories.  By the time Reagan assumed the Presidency, labor unions had 
been significantly weakened, and regulations had been either removed, 
scaled back, or with Reagan appointees now running the agencies, less 
aggressively enforced.157 
A.  The Revolt of the Owners 
Despite the changes that had occurred during the 1970s, 
management’s position remained relatively secure.  This started to 
change during the 1980s, however.  The stock market decline of 1974 
left the market dormant for several years.  Meanwhile, Keynesian 
economics began to lose adherents, and alternative approaches began to 
emerge.  In addition to the “supply-side” approach, a second alternative, 
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known as agency theory, began to take hold.158  Agency theory had 
originated in financial economics, and one of its central concerns, as 
illustrated in a foundational article by Michael Jensen and William 
Meckling, was the relation between shareholders and managers.  By 
managers, the authors meant the leading officers of the firm, as distinct 
from the board of directors.159  As Berle and Means had suggested, and 
as later observers had elaborated, managers and owners did not 
necessarily share the same interests.  Owners were concerned with the 
firm’s financial performance, its stock price, and its payment of 
dividends.  Managers, while concerned with performance, had other 
interests as well, including their own salaries and benefits and a desire to 
limit dividends as a means of increasing their available cash.  If Bell, 
Dahrendorf, Galbraith, and Kaysen were correct, managers also had 
concerns other than the pure maximization of profits.160  Among these 
concerns was an awareness of the interests of the larger stakeholder 
community, in addition to those of stockholders. 
Managers are appointed by a board of directors, whose members 
are elected by the stockholders.  In the traditional theory of the firm, the 
managers are expected to be working in the interest of the stockholders.  
To the extent that stockholders and managers have conflicts of interest, 
however, there is an inherent problem in the owner-management 
relationship.  Given the broad dispersal of stock during the twentieth 
century, which gave managers a relatively high degree of autonomy, how 
were owners going to ensure that their interests were supported?  In the 
view of agency theorists, the fundamental question raised by the 
separation of ownership from control was how owners were going to 
monitor their employees—the management.  The primary answer, 
agency theorists determined, was “alignment of incentives.”161  That is, it 
was necessary to create a system whereby the interests of managers and 
owners converged.  A good way to do this was to ensure that managers’ 
compensation was linked to the firm’s stock price.  And a way to ensure 
this link was to use the firm’s stock as a form of managerial 
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compensation.  It turned out that even the use of stock as compensation 
did not ultimately solve the problem.  As the Enron case illustrated, it 
was possible for managers to artificially drive up the firm’s stock price 
and then sell out before others realized that the firm was worth far less.162  
But our concern here is with another issue raised by agency theorists. 
As stock prices continued to stagnate through the late 1970s and 
into the early 1980s, investors began to see the possibility that many 
leading firms were “undervalued”—that is, their market (stock) value 
was less than their book (accounting) value.  This was seen as an 
opportunity.  And as we moved into the 1980s, an acquisition wave of 
unprecedented proportions developed.  Although the United States had 
experienced several earlier acquisition waves, most recently in the 1960s, 
what occurred during the 1980s dwarfed these earlier events.163  Alfred 
Chandler had shown that during the twentieth century, there had been a 
remarkable degree of stability among the largest American 
corporations.164  In the single decade of the 1980s, fully one-third of the 
Fortune 500 manufacturers disappeared, in most cases the result of 
acquisition by other firms rather than dissolution.165 
This acquisition wave was fueled in part by the emergence of a new 
form of financing—low quality, high yield bonds, subsequently labeled 
“junk bonds”—and it was characterized by an enormous level of 
instability in the financial world.  Of particular interest is the rationale 
that was used to justify this wave.  In the view of agency theorists, stock 
prices had been depressed due to poor management.166  The firm 
takeovers were a means by which underperforming managers were 
replaced by a new group who would operate the firm in a more efficient 
manner.  This created a situation not seen for many decades: a 
management that was suddenly vulnerable.  And in fact, there was 
considerable evidence for this.  CEO tenure declined sharply during the 
1980s, and this trend continued into the 2000s.167  Firings occurred in 
firms whose managers had been assumed to be invulnerable, such as the 
1992 ouster of General Motors’s Robert Stempel.  The increasingly 
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precarious role of management was further illustrated in a detailed study 
of ten firms by Useem.168  As Zajac and Westphal showed, an ideological 
shift had occurred in which the earlier glorification of management had 
been replaced by a focus on “shareholder value”—the notion that 
managers were mere hired hands whose primary, if not sole, charge was 
to increase the share price of their firms.169  These developments raised 
the possibility that the era of the management-controlled corporation, the 
firm of The Modern Corporation, had come to an end. 
The idea that stockholders had finally reasserted their control over 
the firm received further support from the continually increasing role of 
institutional investors.  As we noted earlier, Berle himself had anticipated 
the growing role of institutional stockholders back in 1954, and he even 
raised the possibility that they would someday come to dominate the 
firm.170  By the 1960s, the trust departments of leading commercial banks 
had come to hold relatively large shares in a significant proportion of 
leading American corporations.  The Patman Committee171 found that a 
single bank trust department held a 5% or greater share of stock in more 
than 29% of the 500 largest nonfinancial corporations.  Based on these 
and subsequent data, an economist, David Kotz,172 estimated that nearly 
40% of the 200 largest U.S. nonfinancial corporations were at least 
partially controlled by banks.173  And in a 1968 interview, Berle, 
following up on his 1954 observation, noted that “about fifteen or twenty 
of the big banks through their trust departments could today mobilize 
voting control of a very large percentage of American industry.”174  In 
subsequent years, commercial bank trust departments were joined by 
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mutual funds such as Fidelity and Vanguard and pension funds such as 
CalPERS and CREF as leading stockholders.175 
Historically, these trust funds and other investors were believed to 
be bound by the “Wall Street Rule”: when dissatisfied with management, 
sell.176  As institutional holdings became increasingly large, however, the 
costs of the exit strategy became prohibitive, and there was reason for 
these investors to exercise more of a voice strategy.177  As Useem 
suggests, institutional investors have become increasingly active in 
pursuing their agendas with the firms whose stock they hold.178  We do 
not want to push this “decline of management” argument too far, 
however, since evidence remains that managerial power has not 
completely disappeared.  Davis and Kim show, for example, that 
although pension funds such as CalPERS and CREF have become 
increasingly willing to challenge management, mutual funds such as 
Fidelity have been far less likely to do so.179  Moreover, despite cases 
such as the 1968 Leasco–Chemical Bank episode, a range of scholars 
representing differing views have questioned the extent to which bank 
trust departments intervene in the affairs of the firms in whose stock they 
have invested.180  Cheffins and Bank provide several reasons that bank 
trust departments would be unlikely (and unwise) to challenge 
management, including the potential conflict of interest that might occur 
were bank trust departments to use their stockholdings to further the 
commercial interests of the bank, rather than the interests of the firms 
whose pension funds they are entrusted to invest.181  Finally, events such 
as the Enron and Worldcom scandals of the early 2000s suggested that 
managers were able to engage in unscrupulous activities while shielded 
not only from stockholders but also from their boards.182  Although these 
may have been relatively unique cases in the same way that the Leasco–
Chemical Bank case was unique,183 the problems that they revealed were 
deemed sufficiently serious to spawn broad legislation: the Sarbanes–
Oxley Bill.184  After an exhaustive review of studies based on evidence 
dating from 1900 to the present, Cheffins and Bank conclude that “a 
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separation between ownership and control remains an appropriate 
reference point for those seeking to come to terms with the historical 
development of U.S. corporate governance[.]”185 
Nevertheless, even if the separation of ownership from control 
remains the predominant condition of the largest American corporations, 
it does not mean that management has the level of autonomy that it 
enjoyed during its golden age, from the 1920s through the early 1970s.  
And the increasing pressures faced by corporate CEOs have 
consequences for the fate of American democracy, just as the separation 
of ownership and control did in the post-World War II period. 
B.  The Aftermath of the 1980s, and its Consequences for Management 
We argued earlier that critics accused the much-maligned postwar 
interpreters of The Modern Corporation—scholars such as Daniel Bell, 
Ralf Dahrendorf, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Talcott Parsons—of 
misrepresenting Berle and Means’s arguments to make their case for the 
dissolution of corporate power and the increased democratization of 
American society.  We also suggested that these authors, with the 
exception of Galbraith, may have ignored or underemphasized the degree 
to which Berle and Means were wary of, rather than celebrating, the 
separation of ownership from control.  On the other hand, however 
selective these authors’ readings of The Modern Corporation may have 
been, we also suggested that their views of the postwar position of 
American business contained an element of tenability.  The leaders of the 
American corporate elite during the postwar period did exhibit a 
relatively high degree of concern for society’s well-being.  Still, there is 
no need to romanticize this group.  The largest American firms continued 
to aggressively oppose the actions of labor unions, and they continued 
their suspicious attitudes toward the state.186  Yet when viewed in 
historical perspective—especially when compared with the period that 
began in the 1970s—the corporate elite of the postwar period was 
relatively moderate, relatively pragmatic, and relatively conscious of and 
concerned about the social problems in American society. 
It was precisely the large, management-controlled corporations that 
created the conditions within which firm leaders could exercise this 
pragmatic approach.  Largely insulated from market pressures, as well as 
pressures from stockholders and bankers, managers were free to pursue 
broader goals.  It was not only management-controlled firms that 
exhibited these tendencies, of course.  Large, family-controlled firms, 
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such as Ford, had shown great commitment to their local communities 
for decades and continued to do so during the managerial era.187  In both 
cases, it was the ability to act unrestrained by the capital markets that 
was the key factor. 
The economic crisis of the 1970s led to a breakdown in this postwar 
accommodation and led corporate elites to turn increasingly against both 
labor and the state.  The acquisition wave of the 1980s then had the 
effect of significantly weakening management.  Increasingly less able to 
act with autonomy and subject to increased pressures from the financial 
community and their own peers, managers became less able to concern 
themselves with long-term decision-making and the well-being of the 
larger society.  Pressures to compete in global markets and the firms’ 
increasing use of foreign labor (one need not worry about the nation’s 
educational system when one can simply hire employees overseas) 
further exacerbated this trend. 
Mizruchi has argued that the consequence of the success of the 
corporate political offensive of the 1970s was a paradoxical 
fragmentation of business.188  Once business political action had 
achieved its goals, continued organization was no longer necessary.  In 
response, corporations went their separate ways during the 1980s, 
focusing primarily on firm-specific issues, as evidenced by the lobbying 
effort surrounding the 1986 tax reform bill, in which individual firms, or 
small coalitions, pursued narrowly tailored goals.189  The takeover wave 
of the 1980s then largely ended whatever collective organization the 
American corporate community had enjoyed.  The shift to the system of 
largely atomized firms described by Dahrendorf in the 1950s in fact 
reached its fruition in the aftermath of the 1980s.190  The American 
business community, now increasingly disorganized, became incapable 
of generating any form of collective effort to address not only the larger 
problems of the society, but also to even address issues of concern to the 
corporations themselves. 
C.  Two Examples: Taxes and Healthcare 
The corporate elite’s inability to generate effective collective action 
can be seen in the response of the Business Roundtable—now the 
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leading political organization for the largest American corporations—to 
two important issues: taxation and healthcare.  Concerned about the 
record deficits engendered by President Reagan’s income tax cuts, the 
Business Roundtable recommended a tax increase in 1983.191  This was 
an extremely unpopular position to take, but the Roundtable felt that it 
was a necessary step in response to what they viewed as a dangerously 
high deficit.  Even if corporate leaders saw it as ultimately in their self-
interest, this position at least represented an act of responsibility, in 
which business leaders’ concerns for the well-being of the economy led 
them to oppose policies from which they had personally benefited, since 
the tax cuts had brought disproportionate benefits to the wealthy.192  Yet 
two decades later, in 2004, facing an almost identical situation in 
response to President George W. Bush’s tax cuts, the Roundtable was 
silent on the issue.  In a speech at the Detroit Economic Club in April 
2004, John J. Castellani, the President of the Roundtable, spent several 
minutes railing against the deficit but made no mention of the Bush tax 
cuts as a possible cause.193  This silence was especially striking given 
that the United States was involved in the Iraq War and had recently 
experienced the September 11th attacks—both events that could have 
served as the basis for a request that the American public make a 
sacrifice as a show of support for the war effort, which at the time 
remained highly popular. 
The difference between the Business Roundtable’s response to the 
deficit in 2004 and its response in 1983 reflects what we see as the 
breakdown of business collective action, the increasing inability of the 
leaders of the corporate community to support a position consistent with 
society’s—and ultimately its own—long-term interest.  We are not 
suggesting that a tax increase was the only possible response to the 
deficit.  We do believe, however, that the Roundtable’s willingness to 
support a tax increase in 1983, and its failure to do so two decades later, 
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reflects an inability to engage in coordinated collective action to address 
what its members saw as a serious economic problem. 
A second example of the weakness and fragmentation of the 
American corporate elite involves its response to health care reform.  
Mizruchi has estimated that the 500 largest American corporations alone 
spent more than $375 billion on healthcare for their employees in 
2009.194  Given this enormous expense, it would seem to be in these 
companies’ interest for the responsibility for these payments to shift to 
another entity, such as the state.  Healthcare costs have been cited by 
many American firms as putting them at a competitive disadvantage with 
firms from other developed nations, all of which have national health 
care programs.195  And yet American firms have been either unable or 
unwilling to develop or support a proposal for single-payer insurance that 
would demonstrably be in their own economic interests.196  The Business 
Roundtable’s own plan is extremely general and contains little specific 
content, certainly nothing that would shift funding from the firms 
themselves to another entity, such as the state.197  Perhaps it is simply 
ideology that is preventing corporate leaders from embracing a system 
that would alleviate firms from one of their greatest financial burdens.  
Perhaps the Roundtable has in fact conducted a thorough cost-benefit 
analysis that demonstrates that a single-payer system would ultimately 
cost corporations more than the current system of employer-paid 
insurance.  If this is the case, however, then it is unclear why the group 
would not make this analysis available to the public.  Whatever the 
reason for its inaction, the document that the Roundtable produced, and 
its piecemeal efforts to reduce the size of employer mandates in the bill 
that was being debated in the Senate in January 2010, reflect a group that 
is incapable of coordinated action to advance its interests. 
What these examples represent, then, is a paradox.  In the period of 
managerial ascendance in which their power was largely unquestioned 
and untouched, the leaders of the American business community 
exhibited a pragmatic, moderate perspective that allowed them to support 
a relatively active state and to accept the legitimacy, if not the demands, 
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of labor unions.  In the post-managerial period, in which corporate CEOs 
no longer enjoy their earlier level of autonomy, we have a fragmented, 
ineffectual business community, one that is seemingly incapable of 
addressing any of the important issues of the day.  It is true that there are 
individuals such as Bill Gates and Warren Buffett who have engaged in 
significant philanthropic activities.  There are also groups of 
corporations, such as those involved in a Pew Foundation initiative, that 
have taken voluntary steps to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases.  
These efforts are relatively isolated, however, and none involve the kind 
of cooperation with the state that the Committee for Economic 
Development viewed as necessary to address societal problems in a 1971 
position statement.198  The corporate elite of the twenty-first century has 
thus far exhibited little of the efficacy that characterized its predecessor 
of the postwar period. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
We began this essay by noting that classic works are often 
selectively interpreted by their readers, or not read at all.  Those who do 
read the works see what they want to see and ignore the rest.199  We saw 
that those who made use of Berle and Means’s classic work, The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property, especially those writing in the post-
World War II period, tended to focus on the separation of ownership 
from control rather than on an equally important component of the 
book—Berle and Means’s concern with concentrated economic power 
and its implications for American democracy. 
In reviewing these secondary works, however, we discovered two 
things: First, not all of these authors were as unaware of Berle and 
Means’s concern about concentrated power as their subsequent critics 
had assumed.  Second, however selectively they may have used Berle 
and Means, with the hindsight of half a century, it is evident that these 
scholars’ characterizations of the postwar American corporation did 
indeed have merit.  The separation of ownership from control helped 
create a class of managers with a relatively moderate, pragmatic 
approach to the concerns of the larger society.  The resurgence of 
investors in the 1980s, however, placed managers under increasing 
pressures, which led in part to the fragmentation and ineffectuality of the 
corporate elite. 
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Viewing Berle and Means’s arguments in a broad historical 
perspective, we believe that they were correct about the rise of 
management control.  We also believe that they were justified in raising 
concerns about concentrated economic power.  Yet a system of 
constraints existed in the post-World War II United States that gave rise 
to a corporate elite that, if neither liberal nor altruistic, did exhibit a 
pragmatic concern for the well-being of the larger society. 
The turmoil of the 1970s and the acquisition wave of the 1980s 
took their toll on this responsible corporate elite, however.  Management 
came increasingly under siege in the 1980s.  This weakening of 
management did not lead to a furthering of democracy, but instead 
resulted in the thwarting of it, as the lack of business collective action 
became just one component of the gridlock that gripped national policy 
making from the 1990s onward.  Managers’ fears of Wall Street 
investors—both the professionals who handle investments for 
institutional stockholders200 and the analysts who issue quarterly profit 
projections201—have significantly transformed the system, but this has 
not necessarily led to a more well-functioning political environment. 
The sociologist E. Digby Baltzell, himself a member of the 
Philadelphia upper class, argued that a democratic society requires a 
committed and responsible elite.202  This is a statement with which Adolf 
A. Berle, Jr., who wrote of elites “running museums of modern art, 
foreign aid programs, and civic services,” might have agreed.  We 
believe that in an earlier era, the United States had a group that at least 
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